UNMAS in Libya - another critical failure

Andy Smith, 2012

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) began its work in Libya in April or May 2011 (from a Cyprus base) and were to organise the removal of mines and the explosive remnants of war. The then interim government of Free Libya assigned an Army Colonel to act as their liaison person and UNMAS set itself up as the leader of Mine Action in Libya.

The UNMAS office was staffed by people without relevant experience in Libya, but they did their best to co-ordinate the efforts of international NGOs who moved in to help with the Mine Action agenda. Calling this collaboration a Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT), they published regular newsletters detailing the work that had been conducted. I have these on record and it is fairly uncontroversial for me to say that the JMACT achievements often looked minimal - with a greater stress being placed on Mine Risk Education than the removal of immediate threats. This is in line with "traditional" approaches to establishing a long-term Mine Action programme, but was not appropriate for dealing with an emergency post-conflict situation in which mines had hardly been used and many ordnance contaminated areas were needed immediately. Some staff of the NGOs under the JMACT umbrella contacted me to complain about the UNMAS lack of direction which prevented them doing work that needed to be done. Libyan friends contacted me to say that UNMAS was insulting them by not reporting the far greater amount of emergency clearance being conducted by Libyan nationals.

For example, because NATO avoided bombing schools and hospitals these buildings were routinely used by both sides in the fighting, then withdrawn from in haste leaving a litter of abandoned and unexploded ordnance that presented a threat to the population moving back. Most of these problems were cleared by Libyans, working through the revolutionary brigades or as individuals. Semi-formal battle area clearance groups of Libyan volunteers have operated all over the country. As early as May, the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LMAC) was started and the first monitoring of "liberated" ammunition storage areas had begun. (Yes, it wasn't comprehensive, but it was a start that deserved publicising.)

In May 2011, I became a founder member of LMAC, advising from outside Libya. I advised them to work with UNMAS but UNMAS refused to have anything to do with them - apparently saying that individuals from Tripoli were tainted by association with the Ghaddafi regime. It is hard to imagine how their Colonel in Benghazi achieved a Colonel's rank without being associated with the regime, and even harder to understand why UNMAS took it upon itself to decide who was an acceptable representative of Free Libya. The founders of LMAC had worked in Mine Action in Libya under the old regime, had supported the revolution, and had begun voluntary Mine Action work as soon as possible. No one was better prepared to lead LMAC during and after the revolution.

As the months passed more and more Libyan teams were conducting essential battle area clearance with never a mention by UNMAS/JMACT. Many worked in a manner that would not meet international standards, but they got the job done quickly and "managed" the risk to civilians in a way that undoubtedly reduced injuries. Being flexible about the standards in an emergency situation is hardly new - when necessary in the field, every responsible demining agency does it. Meanwhile a few Libyan groups tried to work to Libya's own Mine Action Standards (based on the International Standards) and I have seen them work to as high a standard as many international NGOs. That they worked unpaid, or paid minimally by Libyan businessmen, is a remarkable indication of the level of social cohesion and commitment to peace that exists in Libya. When UNMAS publicises the problems (often inaccurately) and does not mention the achievements, this presents a warped picture that does the Libyan led peace effort no favours.

In November 2011 LMAC was formally recognised by the new government of Libya. When the Minister of Defence was appointed, his first directive was to appoint LMAC as the MoD's executive arm to deal with Mine Action issues and the securing of Ammunition Storage Areas. I was with LMAC in Tripoli at the time and still advised that LMAC should partner with UNMAS because UNMAS had access to the funds that were necessary if the group were to be paid. Of course, this was a case of advising on a "least bad" option, but the desire to support a peaceful transition in Libya was paramount. The LMAC people were disillusioned with UNMAS because of their protracted lack of respect, but I argued that the UNMAS staff in Libya were inexperienced and their disrespect was probably more political than personal.

LMAC now had a governing body comprising half former soldiers and half former revolutionaries - a sustainable mix of people and one that included the UNMAS Liaison Colonel from Benghazi. They had a Technical Agreement signed with the US Government for a project to secure the Ammunition Storage Areas, and they had an increasing number of committed volunteers. The country has a brigade of former soldiers trained to international standards in 2009/10 by MECHEM, just waiting to be reformed and set to work.

But UNMAS ignored all this. In the middle of December 2011, UNMAS, the UN and JMACT saw no reason to even mention LMAC and the work they are doing when they launched their "Urgent Mine Action Appeal" for almost 20 million dollars to spend in Libya in 2012 (12% for UNMAS, naturally). In brief, the appeal stressed Libya's problems without balancing them against the achievements of Libyan people. This works against peace-building during which positive messages about the people's achievements can have rippling copycat consequences, and negative messages can do likewise.

UNMAS' New York leadership seems to have been more interested in revising the UNMAS history, especially with regard to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) at that time (they now pretend that the IMAS have always been UN standards, never "International"). UNMAS claims that its primary role is as a focal point for "coordination" but their achievements in Libya imply that they cannot achieve the required focus to coordinate with nationals. Also, their myopic tunnel-vision seem to leave them unaware of the role that Mine Action should play in helping promote peace in Libya.

As 2012 started, UNMAS began to talk to LMAC but not as the leader of Mine Action in Libya, as an organisation that they should control. Their disrespect extended to not referring to them by their official Libyan name - a Mine Action Centre - until January was well under way - and pretending that they were "newly formed" (so implying falsely that perhaps UNMAS had a hand in that).

NGOs have begun to offer LMAC the specialist help they have asked for, but UNMAS seeks to control it with the imposition of the standard UNMAS/GiHAD bureaucracy (jobs + 12%) that is not needed for what will be a short-term intervention because the long-term Mine Action work will be conducted by Libyan nationals with Libyan funding - so should be controlled by Libyans as Libya sees fit. UNMAS cannot realistically object to this when LMAC has a set of national Mine Action standards based on the 2009 international standards (more up-to-date than many countries) - or when UNMAS' coordination in Libya leaves so much to be desired.

UNMAS wasted valuable time by ignoring LMAC. Whether this was to protect its own role or because they were ill-advised does not really matter - because it is seen as self-motivated, disrespectful and ignorant. They ignored the very widespread clean-up efforts of Libyan nationals - so providing evidence for the view that UNMAS staff are blind to the need for Libyans to lead all sustained peace-building efforts. Specialist assistance should be accepted when appropriate, but Libya should not cede control to UNMAS. And if some donor assistance must be UN coordinated, that would be better done by the UNDP country office - with which LMAC staff have had good experiences.

With HI leading, I hope that the international Mine Action NGOs operating in country - such as Danish Demining Group (DDG), Handicap International (HI), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) - will provide staff for the advisory roles that will make LMAC efficient rapidly. This is important because this help is wanted now, but it must be help that will empower Libya and be sustainable, not an overlay of UNMAS dictated bureaucracy with its related jobs in New York and Geneva.

That said, if UNMAS had the money to do some useful work on the ground (and LMAC wanted them there), I would always support that (and, unlikely as it sounds, it might be possible). But relying on them for coordination? Well, their record of ignoring the efforts of Libyan nationals to date speaks for itself.

Donors should give their money direct to LMAC or to the international NGOs that work with LMAC.